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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the State of Utah 
WILBUR BURNHAM, CHARLES L. 
BURNHAM, FRANCES L. MAYO, 
KENNETH A. LUCKEY, and 
WALKER BANK & TRUST COM-
pANY, a corporation, as administrator 
of the estate of JENNIE B. SCHANK, 
Deceased, 
PZa,iJntiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
LETA B. ESCHLER, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7209 
The essential inquiry here is to discover the pur-
pose and intention of Jennie B. Schank in connection 
with the execution and delivery of the deeds which are 
the subject of this litigation. As a background against 
which to project such an inquiry, there must be clearly 
before the court all of the important fact;s in the relation-
ship between grantor and grantee. The significant facts 
in the case are so slighted in appellants' brief that we 
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feel under obligation to the court and to our client to set 
them forth her~e. 
At the time first referred to in the record, the sev-
veral members of the Burnham family resided in Salt 
Lake City. They were Mrs. Burnham, the mother, three 
daughters and two brothers. The brothers were Wilbur 
and Charles L. Burnham, who are appellants in this 
case. The sisters were Jennie, Maritta and Sonoma Burn-
ham. (Tr. 3, 4) 
Jennie Burnham married Louis Schank. (Tr. 117, 
123, 180) She and Louis established a business on lower 
Second Avenue in Salt Lake City. ( Tr. 102, 103, 118, 
119, 163, 168, 180, 214) They devoted themselves to 
the business and prospered in the pursuit of it. (Tr. 104, 
105, 119, 181) Unfortunately, they remained childless to 
the end of their days. (Tr. 3) Sonoma Burnham married 
a man named Luckey. She became the mother of two 
children, Kenneth Luckey and Frances Luckey Mayo, 
who are appellants in this case. (Tr. 3) Maritta Burn-
ham married a man by the name of Brazier. (Tr. 101, 
102) They established their home near that of Jennie 
and Louis. (Tr. 102, 103, 123) Maritta became the 
mother of two children, a boy Melvin and a daughter 
called Leta, who is respondent here. (Tr. 101, 102) 
When Leta was five years of age her father died and 
her mother was required to find work in order to sup-
port herself and children. (Tr. 102) Her work kept her 
away from her home from 8 :00 in the morning until after 
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6:00 each evening. Shortly after her father's death Leta 
began her schooling at the Lafayette School near the 
home of her mother, and near the home of Mrs. Schank. 
. (Tr. 103) 
Leta went from her school in the afternoon to the 
home of her Aunt Jennie Schank to await her mother's 
return from work. (Tr. 103) The habit of going from 
school to the Schank home became fixed in the life of 
Leta, and was the beginning of a lasting companionship 
between Leta and her Aunt Jennie and Uncle Louis 
Schank. The affectionate attachment thus established 
continued and grew from those early beginnings to the 
very last day of Jennie Schank's life. Jennie Schank, be-
ing ehildless, found an object for her affection and de-
votion in the little girl. (Tr. 60, 82, 83, 84, 85, 103-107, 
108, 109, 113, 114, 119, 120, 124, 125, 126, ·140, 149, 150, 
158,165,166,167,173,181) 
During the joint lives of Louis and Jennie Schank, 
both of them focused their attention and devotion and 
their tender care upon Leta. Louis and Jennie so far 
prospered that they were able to attend conventions of 
the National Grocers' Association at various cities in 
the United States far removed from Salt Lake City, and 
on many such trips they took Leta with them. Wh-en Leta 
was ten, Jennie and Louis Schank took her with them 
on a trip to Alaska. When she was sixteen, they took her 
on a three month's tour of Europe. (Tr. 85, 104, 105, 106, 
107, 113, 114, 119, 120, 123, 124, 130, 131, 133, 139, 140, 
148,149,150,165,166,173,180,181) 
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In the day to day routine of life, Leta occupied the 
place in the hearts of both Jennie and Louis Schank 
which a natural child would have occupied. (Tr. 40, 59, 
60, 82, 83, 104, 105, 113, 114, 116, 119, 120, 126, 173)' 
Jennie bought new Clothes for Leta and repaired old 
ones. (Tr. 82, 105, 125, 12·6, 139, 148, 173) She paid for 
dancing lessons and when the dancing lessons had pro-
gressed so far that Leta became expert, Jennie Schank 
drove her in her automobile to places of exhibition and 
proudly ·exhibited Leta as the result of her care and at-
tention. (Tr. 100, 106, 108, 109, 124, 125, 132, 148, 173) 
In 1935, Leta was married to Logan Russell Eschler 
and established a home of her own in Salt Lake City. 
That marriage, rather than weakening the bond of af-
fection between Leta and Mrs. Schank, brought on an 
·even stronger attachment, and the devotion of Mrs. 
Schank to Leta was enlarged to encompass Leta's chil-
dren and her husband. In 1936, Louis Schank died. The 
loss of Louis strengthened the devotion of J.ennie for 
Leta and singled out Leta more definitely than before as 
the na;tural object of Jennie's bounty. (Tr. 106, 119, 120, 
126, 173) 
In 1941, Leta's husband joined the armed forces and 
was required to report at San Louis Obispo in California. 
Leta and her little ones joined the husband in California, 
where they maintained a home in several communities 
during the war. During that time Mrs. Schank made fre-
quent visits to Leta's home in California, and on many 
occasions Mrs. Schank put up fruit in Salt Lake City 
and transported it to California for the use of Leta and 
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children. \Yhen she was not with Leta and children in 
California, she wrote them at least once a week, and 
almost daily called Leta's mother, ~Iaritta Brazier, to in-
quire if any word had come from Leta or the children. 
While Leta's husband, Russell, was overseas, Mrs. 
Schank wrote him once a week. ( Tr. 52-57, 82, 83, 84, 90, 
106,107,108,131) 
In the meantime, Mrs. Schank was not thoughtless 
of her mother, but except for her mother, there is no 
evidence that any other member of the family shared the 
affection and attention of ~Irs. Schank with Leta. After 
the death of ~irs. Schank's mother in 1944, Mrs. Schank 
made Leta and her children the sole object of her de-
votbn. (Tr. 45, 60, 82, 85, 86, 87, 106, 107, 108, 113, 114, 
115, 116, 119, 120, 126, 130, 133, 134, 139, 140, 149, 150, 
152,154,165,166,167,173,182) 
The facts that we have recited are entirely without 
dispute in the record. In addition to members of the 
family who testified, thirteen friends of long standing 
who knew Mrs. Schank intimately and saw her frequent-
ly, appeared and testified as to the relationship between 
her and Leta. To some of the witnesses Mrs. Schank 
had stated specifically that the only thing she had left 
in life was Leta and her children. (Tr. 82, 106, 119, 120, 
126, 139, 140, 173) To others she had stated that her 
purpose was to see to it that Leta and her children were 
given security. (Tr. 62, 63, 65, 88, 89, 90, 166) Others 
had stated that friends of both Mr. and Mrs. Schank had 
assumed from the re1ationship between them and among 
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them that Le.ta was the natural child of Jennie and Louis. 
(Tr. 158, 181) 
Because the decisions dealing with kindred prob-
lem3 lay much emphasis on the relationship between 
grantor and grantee, it is important to bear in mind that 
Leta was the natural object of Mrs. Schank's affection 
and bounty. They were in no sense strangers. The blood 
relationship was that of aunt and niece, which relation-
ship is in itself important and is in its·elf sufficient to 
make Leta a natural obiect of Mrs. Schank's bounty, but 
in this case the relationship was of a peculiar and un-
usual quality. Al'l of the witnesses who had ample and 
constant opportunity to observe, made it plain, not only 
that the devotion of Mrs. Schank to Leta began while the 
child was small, but that it persisted to the end of Mrs. 
Schank's life, and when we say the end of Mrs. Schank's 
life, we mean to the very last day. Mrs. Schank died sud-
denly at the Elk's Club in Salt Lake City on the evening 
of March 30, 1947. That very afternoon she proudly re-
ported to two of her friends that she had tha:t day sent 
away a parcel as a gift to one of Leta's children. (Tr. 
3,149,150,167) 
What did the record show as to Mrs. Schank's at-
titude to her other relatives~ No witness came forward 
to testify that she ever spoke affectionately of any of 
the m·embers of her family, ·with the exception of her 
mother, and on occasions of her sister Maritta. No claim 
was ever brought forth that any other member of Mrs. 
Schank's family shared her affection with Leta. In fact, 
the record is undisputed 'that appellants seldom visited 
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at her hon1e, and that she cared little about them. (Tr. 
-:1:3, 86, S7, 115, 116) It is also the undisputed evidence 
that :Jirs. Schank held one of the appellants, Charles L. 
Burnham-referred to in the record as Roy Burnham-
in such low esteem that she would not allow him to set 
foot upon her property. ( Tr. 15-±) 
It being clear that :Jirs. Schank focused her devotion 
upon Leta and her family, and that it was her desire and 
intention to make substantial provision for Leta and her 
family, did she do anything to carry her purpose and in-
tention into effect? 
~Irs. Schank was the owner of many parcels of real 
estate in Salt Lake County. (Tr. 13, 14, 174) Some were 
unimproved, while some were improved and yielded reve-
nue. (Tr. 17, 18, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 32, 76) As the 
own~r of the property, she managed and maintained and 
preserved it. In addition to owning real ·estate, she owned 
mortgages and notes and other revenue-producing as-
sets. (Tr. 42, 157, 162, 164, 169, 194) From time to time 
she did business with C. H. Dowse and his son S. W. 
Dowse, who maintained a real ·estate office on State 
Street in Salt Lake City. (Tr. 36, 40, 42) On the 20th 
day of December, 1938, ~Irs. Schank called at the of-
fice of Mr. Dowse and his son, where she directed that 
certain deeds be prepared. In accordance with her re-
que:5t, Mr. S. W. Dowse prepared at least nine real estate 
deeds, in accordance with Mrs. Schank's directions. Each 
deed described a specific parcel of land in Salt Lake 
County. The deeds were thereafter signed by Jennie B. 
Sclnnk in the presence of S. W. Dowse, and Mrs. Shank's 
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acknowledgment was taken by C. H. Dowse as Notary 
Public. C. H. Dowse was dead at the time of the trial, 
but S. W. Dowse was sworn and testified that the deeds 
were signed by Mrs. Schank in his pres·ence. (Tr. 36, 37, 
38, 29, 40) 
Among the deeds made out by S. W. Dowse and 
signed by Mrs. Schank on that occasion were the nine 
deeds involved in this litigation. (Tr. 36, 37) When 
the deeds were made out and signed, Mrs. Schank asked 
that the name of the grantee be left blank. After she had 
signed the deeds, and after her acknowledgment had been 
taken by C. H. Dowse, Mrs. Schank stated that she would 
supply the name of the grantee in the deeds at a later 
time when she would see to it that the property went to 
the party she wanted to have it, and would not go to 
members of her family whom she did not care to have it. 
(Tr. 36, 39, 40, 45) 'She carried the deeds away from Mr. 
Dowse's office without having the name of the grantee 
filled in. (Tr. 47) The record is silent as to where the 
deeds were kept thereafter, or as to when the name of 
Leta B. Eschler was fi'lled in as grantee. But the record 
is such as to compel the conclusion that they were filled 
in by or under the direction of Mrs. Schank in her life-
time. 
In March of 1946 Mrs. Schank made one of her many 
visits to Leta and her family. Leta was then living in 
Saratoga, California. While visiting in Saratoga, Mrs. 
Schank sat and talked with Leta's husband, L. Russ·ell 
Eschler. She handed him an envelope which contained the 
deeds in this case. When she gave him the envelope she 
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stated that she was ''giving these properties to Leta and 
she wanted me to hold them until after her death. She 
made that express request, and that-she stated that 
she didn't want Leta to feel any personal obligation to 
her while she was still living.'' At the time the parcel 
of deeds was delivered to Leta's husband, Mrs. Schank 
and Leta's husband discussed the husband's income and 
the revenue that was derived from the properties cov-
ered by the deeds. ~Irs. Schank stated that it was her 
opinion that it would be a burden upon Leta and her hus-
band. to pay the taxes, which were in excess of the reve-
nues on the property, and stated that she wanted to pay 
the taxes herself for Leta. ( Tr. 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65) 
Thereafter, Leta's husband opened the envelope con-
taining the deeds and examined them. ( Tr. 7 4) The 
deeds named Leta B. Eschler as grantee, and were in all 
respects complete ~deeds. ·They were in the 
same condition when delivered to Russell Eschler as they 
were when offered in evidence in the court below, ex-
cept for the recording data put upon them by the Re-
corder of Salt Lake County. ( Tr. 64, 75) 
Upon her return from California, Mrs. Schank 
stated to the witness, Daisy Bane, that she had been visit-
ing with Leta and tha;t she had left some deeds with Rus-
sell. (Tr. 87, 88) 
Russell Eschler placed the deeds in a briefcase with 
his •1wn personal papers and said nothing about them to 
Leta. Approximately a year after delivering the deeds to 
Russell, Mrs. Schank died. Following her funeral, Russel1 
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delivered the deeds to Leta and she placed them of 
record in the office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake 
County. (Tr. 11, 12, 64) 
Following deliv,ery of the deeds by Mrs. Schank to 
Leta's husband, Mrs. Schank continued to manage the 
property and to collect the revenues therefrom and to 
pay the taxes levied thereon. She discussed with certain 
real estate brokers the possibility of selling one or more 
of the parcels of land, but she never sold or encumbered 
the land in any way. (Tr. 49, 51, 203,204, 221) The prop-
erty covered by the nine deeds was not self-sustaining, 
and it was entirely consistent with the statement made 
by Mrs. Schank to Russell Eschler at the time of de-
livery that she should maintain and preserve the prop-
erty by the collection of rents and the payment of taxes 
until Leta's enjoyment of the property should take ef-
fect, or until she was in a financial condition to carry the 
burden of the property. (Tr. 31, 32, 63, 65, 76) 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
DECREE 
The trial court saw and heard all of the witnesses 
and examined all of the documents received in e\'idence. 
He listened to the arguments of counsel, then made his 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree, quieting 
title to all of the parcels of land involved in this litiga-
tion in respondent Leta B. Eschler. 
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In substance the court found that Leta B. Eschler 
was the object of ~Irs. Schank's love and affection, and 
therefore the natural object of her bounty; that on De-
cember 20, 1938, Jennie B. Schank, at the office of S. 
W. Dowse in Salt Lake City, signed and acknowledged 
each of the nine deeds involved in this case ; that at 
various times to various persons Jennie B. Schank had 
made known her intention to provide for the security of 
Leta B. Eschler and her children. He found that some 
time prior to March of 1946, Jennie B. Schank completed 
each of the nine deeds by inserting, or causing to be in-
serted, in each of the same the name of Leta B. Eschler 
as grantee and that in the month of March, 1946, Jennie 
B. Schank delivered each and all of the nine deeds so 
completed to Russell Eschler, the husband of Leta B. 
Eschler, with the statement that she was giving the 
properties to Russell's wife Leta. He found that at the 
time of delivering the said deeds to Russell Eschler, 
Jennie B. Schank intended to and did completely and ir-
revocably divest herself of control and dominion over 
said deeds; that simultaneously with the delivery of said 
deeds, Jennie B. Schank informed Russell Eschler that 
the property described in said deeds was being given to 
Leta for the security and protection of Leta; that Leta 
should not be informed of the delivery of the deeds dur-
ing the lifetime of Jennie B. Schank. He found that at 
the time of delivery of said deeds to Russell Esch1er, 
Jennie B. Schank further expressed the desire that she 
continue to pay the taxes and expenses incident to the 
management and maintenance of the property, so that 
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the management and expense of said property would not 
he a burden upon Leta or her family. 
Further, the court found that after delivery of the 
deeds, Jennie B. Schank continued in the management, 
control and possession of the property for the use and 
benefit of Leta B. Eschler; that at the time of the de-
livery of the deeds and thereafter until the death of J en-
nie B. Schank, the expense and maintenance of the prop-
erties exceeded the revenues therefrom; that Jennie B. 
Schank collected the rents and paid the taxes and ex-
pen3es of maintenance; that after the delivery of said 
deeds, Jennie B. Schank from time to time made state-
ments indicating her ownership of the property and dis-
cussed the possibility of selling one or more parcels of 
land with 1and brokers. But Jennie B. Schank never did 
sell or agree to sell any of the property. The court found 
that with reference to one parcel of land described in 
one of the deeds described herein, Jennie B. Schank 
stated that such parcel of land could not be sold until 
and after Jennie B. Schank had conferred with Leta and 
learned from Leta whether she would rather have the 
property or the benefits of a sale; that as to another 
parcel of land described in another of the said deeds, 
Jennie B. Schank stated that such parcel of land belonged 
to Leta; that Jennie B. Schank never sought to regain 
possession or control of any of the deeds after their 
delivery by her to Russell Eschler; that upon her return 
to Salt Lake City, after delivering the deeds to Russell, 
Jennie B. Schank stated to a neighbor that while in Cali-
fornia she had delivered deeds to Russell; and that after 
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the death of Jennie B. Schank, Russell Eschler handed 
the deeds to Leta, as requested in her lifetime by Jennie 
B. Shank. 
Further, i:he court found that in her lifetim·e, Jennie 
B. Schank intended that the property here involved 
should be the property of Leta, and that Jennie B. 
Schank made delivery of the deeds to carry out her in-
tention in that respect. 
And, finally the court found that the deeds involved 
herein were not changed or altered in any respect what-
soever after their delivery to Russell Eschler; and that 
the possession of said deeds by Russell Eschler was not 
obtained without the full knowledge and consent of 
Jennie B. Sehank; and that the delivery of said deeds 
was not contrary to the intention or wishes of Jennie B. 
Schank. 
The findings of fact made by the court were fully 
supported by the evidence, and any contrary findings 
would have been in conflict with the undisputed evidence 
in the record. 
In harmony with its findings of fact, the court con-
cluded as a matter of law that Jennie B. Schank did not 
die jntestate on the 30th day of March, 1947, with respect 
to any of the property described in the deeds involved in 
this case; and that at the time of her death she was not 
seized in fee simple of said properties; and that pJain-
tiffs Wilbur Burnham, Charles L. Burnham, Frances L. 
Mayo and Kenneth Luckey and Maritta Brazier did not 
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upon the death of Jennie B. Schank become the owners 
and entitled to possession of the said property, as ten-
ants in common, or otherwise; and that the defendant 
Walker Bank & Trust Company, as administrator of the 
Estate of Jennie B. Schank, deceased, is not entitled to 
possession of said properties, or any of them, for the 
purpose of administration, or any other purpose at all. 
The court further concluded that defendant is now 
entitled to possession of each of the parcels of real estate 
described in plaintiffs' complaint and covered by the 
deeds involved herein; that the plaintiffs, and each of 
them, have no right, title or interest in or to said prop-
erties, or any part thereof; that the complaint of plain-
tiffs should be dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
Having made its findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, as above set forth, the court made and entered its 
order and judgment quieting title to the property de-
scribed in plaintiffs' complaint and in the deeds in-
volved herein in Leta B. Eschler. 
DEEDS SrGNED AND AcKNOWLEDGED BY GRANTOR 
By their pleadings, appellants attacked the right 
and claim of Leta B. Eschler by alleging that at no time 
did Jennie B. Schank make any delivery of the deeds 
involved, and that Jennie B. Schank did not intend that 
the deeds involved should be delivered to Leta B. Eschler. 
Appellants further alleged that the name of the grantee 
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in s'lid deeds was filled in without the knowledge or con-
sent of the grantor, and that the said deeds are fraudu-
lent. N"o evidence was produced by the appellants to sub-
stantiate any of their allegations. In their labored argu-
ment over the execution and acknowledgment of the 
deeds, counsel for appellants seem unwilling to grapple 
with the facts of the case and seek refuge in the pro-
tecti.:>n of certain decisions which deal with entirely dif-
ferent facts. That Jennie B. Schank did sign the deeds 
and did acknowledge her signature is entirely beyond 
dispute in this case. S. \V. Dowse made out the deeds 
at the grantor's request, and saw her sign them. In ad-
dition, he saw her acknowledge the execution of the 
deeds before his father who was a Notary Public. Such 
was Dowse's sworn testimony, and no effort was made 
to challenge or discredit a word he said. (Tr. 36-40) 
When Jennie B. Schank left Dowse's office with the 
deeds, she stated that she would supply the names of the 
grantees, so that the property would pass to the party 
whom she desired to have it and avoid passage of the 
title to relatives whom she did not want to have the 
property. (Tr. 39, 40, 45) That she did supply the name 
of the grantee, as she stated she would do, is also left 
clear upon the record. (Tr. ·60-65, 87, 88) Just when Mrs. 
Schank filled in the name of Leta B. Eschler is not 
disclosed. 
DEEDS CoMPLETE WHEN DELIVERED 
But whenever or wherever Mrs. Schank supplied the 
name of Leta B. Eschler in each of the deeds, it is plain 
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that it was done before delivery of the deeds to Russell 
Eschler. In March, 1946, she delivered all nine of the 
deeds to Russell Eschler, and when the deeds were de-
livered they were executed and acknowledged deeds, com-
plete in every particular, with Leta named as grantee. 
Such is the sworn testimony of Russell Eschler. (Tr. 
60-65) The trial court saw and observed Russell Eschler 
upon the witness stand and believed his testimony. The 
court reflected that belief in positive findings of fact. 
Counsel urged that Russell was not worthy of be-
lief, because he abstracted a sheet from one of Mrs. 
Schank's informal books of account. Russell made no 
effort to conceal the fact that he carried away the page, 
and made no effort to deny that it was a mistake on his 
part to have done so. He freely admitted the mistake and 
restored the page to the record so that it would be before 
the trial court for his examination and consideration. The 
page removed had to do with small financial dealings be-
tween Russell Eschler and Mrs. Schank. It was lying in 
the buffet in Mrs. Schank's dining room after her death 
and was subject to examination by Frances Mayo and 
other hostile members of the family. Russell was annoyed 
at the prospect of hostile people examining the record 
of his dealings with Mrs. Schank and impulsively re-
moved the page. He recognized his error and made 
amends by restoration of the page to the record. 
Appellants not only make the most of Russell's re-
moval of the page, but they in their desperation make 
the ~harge that after Mrs. Schank's death Russell Esch-
ler stole the deeds from Mrs. Schank's safe. Only a 
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recognition of the utter futility of their case could lead 
them to any such base and groundless charge. When 
~Irs. Schank died, her house safe was so securely locked 
that it required a locksmith to open it. (Tr. 98, 107) When 
the safe was opened those present were ~Irs. Mayo, (Tr. 
97, 217, 227) one of the appellants; Leta B. Eschler, (Tr. 
97) respondent; :Mrs. niaritta Brazier, (Tr. 107) who is 
Mrs. Eschler's mother; Mrs. Daisy Bane, (Tr. 97) who 
was a close friend and neighbor of ~Irs. Schank; and 
Melvin Brazier, (Tr. 97) a nephew of Mrs. Schank, and 
a brother of respondent. Mrs. Mayo was the one who 
actively examined the contents of the safe. (Tr. 98) 
There is no evidence that Leta B. Eschler removed, or 
even touched, any of the contents of the safe. Mrs. Mayo 
was looking for a receipt. ( Tr. 98, 100, 215) When her 
search of the safe was completed, she was satisfied the 
safe contained no receipt. (Tr. 98-100, 227) A search 
which would satisfy her that no receipt was in the safe 
would certainly have disclosed to her the presence of nine 
deeds if they had been there. Even Mrs. Mayo saw no 
deeds. But Mrs. Mayo did see some documents among the 
contents of the safe which she was not willing to have 
anyone else see. In the presence of the four others, Mrs. 
Mayo took a document from the safe which she read and 
then appropriated with the statement that "No one is 
going to see this'', and no one, as far as the record shows, 
ever saw the document which was removed by Mrs. Mayo. 
our imagination, as appellants have done, to conclude 
(Tr. 99, 100) We would not need to give free flight toJ 
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that the document abstracted by Mrs. Mayo was some-
thing most damaging to her case and equally helpful to 
respondent. It may have been a will leaving all of Mrs. 
Schank's estate to Leta. It may have be·en a letter making 
doubly clear Mrs. Schank's purpose and intention to con-
vey the nine parcels of land involved in this case to 
Leta. Whatever it was, and whatever her motive in tak-
ing the paper from the safe and concealing it, certainly 
one in her position requires an unusual hardihood to sug-
gest that Russell Eschler had gone into the safe in the 
night and stolen the deeds. There should be some evi-
dence to sustain such a venomous charge. The trial court 
didn't believe that Russell Eschler stole or altered any 
deeds. He found to the contrary. 
Not only did Russell impress the court as worthy of 
belief, but his testimony as to the delivery of the deeds 
to him was corroborated by the testimony of Daisy 
Bane. Mrs. Bane was a tenant of Mrs. Schank and lived 
in a house at the rear of Mrs. Schank's home. She was 
a close and confidential friend of Mrs. Schank. They 
visited in Mrs. Bane's home almost ·every day. After 
returning from Saratoga, California, in March of 1946, 
Mrs. Schank told Mrs. Bane that she had left some 
deeds with Russell. ( Tr. 80, 81, 87, 88) Can anyone 
doubt that the deeds she referred to were the same deeds 
to which Russell Eschler referred in his testimony, and 
which are now before this court for review~ 
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GRANTOR's SuBSEQUENT CoNDUCT 
CoNSISTENT WITH CoMPLETED GIFT 
Appellants point to the fact that ~Irs. Schank re-
mained in control of the property, collecting the rentals 
and paying the costs of maintenance and exercising other 
acts of dominion, and urge that those circumstances re-
quire a holding by the court that she never intended the 
gift to be completed in her lifetime. Under the cases which 
we will cite hereinafter, retention of control is a circum-
stance to be considered by the trier of the facts, along 
with all other facts in the case. Such retention is evi-
dence upon the question of intention of the grantor, but 
is by no means conclusive. 
In this case, retention of management by Mrs. 
Schank was entirely consistent with her expressed pur-
pose at the time the deeds were delivered to respondent's 
husband. In March 1946, when Mrs. Schank left the 
deeds with Russell Eschler, she stated that the property 
was not self-sustaining, and that she would like to man-
age and maintain it so no burden would fall upon the 
Eschler family, while Russell was trying to re-establish 
himself after the war. (Tr. 63-65) An effort was made 
by appellants to prove that Mrs. Schank was wrong about 
the property not being self-sustaining. William J. Fitz-
patrick, Trust Offioor of Walker Bank and Trust Com-
pany, which is one of the appellants herein, was pro-
duced and sworn as a witness by appellants before the 
trial court. While on the witness stand, Fitzpatrick testi-
fied that he had examined the books and records of Mrs. 
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Sch3-nk and was familiar with the revenues and the ex-
penses, coming from and attaching to the property in 
suit. He testified that the revenues were insufficient to 
pay the taxes and other costs of maintaining the prop-
erty. (Tr. 31-32) So that Mr. Fitzpatrick, who is an 
appellant and who was a witness, was in full agreement 
with Mrs. Schank that the property was not self-sus-
taining. But the trial court, over the objection of de-
fendants, allowed counsel to reopen the matter upon 
rebuttal and to offer in evidence, through an employee 
of the State Tax Commission, an individual tax return, 
which showed that in the year 1946 Mrs. Schank had a 
taxable income of $500.00. (Ex. "0") Upon cross ex-
amination, it was made plain that Mrs. Schank's taxable 
income resulted from all her income, which included 
renb1s upon the property now in suit, as well as interest 
upon mortgages and other investments. (Tr. 193-194) 
So that while it is not vital in this case, it is clear beyond 
dispute that the property covered by the deeds was not 
self-sustaining, and that Mrs. Schank knew what she 
was talking about when she told Russell Eschler that 
the care and maintenance of the property would be a 
burden upon Leta if she assumed management and con-
trol of it at the time the deeds were delivered. Mrs. 
Schank felt that by holding on to the property, Leta and 
her children would have security. By retaining manage-
ment of the property and discharging the costs and ex-
penses connected therewith, Mrs. Schank would reliev,e 
Leta and her family of the burden of maintaining the 
property or of the necessity of selling it. 
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One parcel of land here involved is located near 
:\Inrray and was referred to upon the trial as the Mur-
ray property. Several persons sought to purchase that 
parcel of land from :Jirs. Schank. To some of them she 
professed ownership of the property, but declined to 
sell and gave as the reason therefore that taxes upon 
the purchase price would be too high. The fact is she did 
not sell or in any way encumber any of the property after 
the deeds had been delivered to Russell Eschler. She was 
under no obligation to give any reason to any real estate 
broker for not selling, but she did use taxes as an elx:.-
cuse. 
But Mrs. Schank felt under some obligation to Mr. 
and l\Irs. Herbert A. Towers, who had expressed a desire 
to buy the property. She had previously told them that if 
she ever sold the property, she would give them the first 
opportunity to buy. After she had delivered the deeds 
to Russell Eschler, Mr. and Mrs. Towers again impor-
tuned Mrs. Schank to sell. When urged by them to sell 
the property, she stated to Mrs. Towers that before the 
property could be sold she, Mrs. Schank, would have to 
consult with Leta and learn from Leta whether she 
would prefer to keep the property, or have it sold and 
have the purchase price. (Tr. 175, 176, 178) This is clear 
evidence that Mrs. Schank, in the fall of 1946, felt that 
she no longer could dispose of the property without 
Leta's consent. 
When Mrs. Schank's friend, Mrs. Tallman, sug-
gested some disposition of a parcel of land on Second 
Avenue in Salt Lake City, which is covered by one of the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
deeds here in question, Mrs. Schank stated to Mrs. Tall-
man that her wishes with respect to the final disposition 
of this property had already been carried out. ('Tr. 165, 
166, 168) In conversations with Mrs. Bane pertaining to 
this same property, she also stated that she would never 
tear down the old store which stands upon part of that 
property, but that she hoped some day Leta would do 
so and build an apartment house or duplex upon it. (Tr. 
89) Mrs. Schank's handling of the property, after she 
h~d made delivery of the deeds, was not inconsistent with 
her purpose to give in her lifetime the title to the prop-
erty to Leta. In her lifetime, Mrs. Schank made de-
livery of nine fully completed, ·executed and acknowl-
edged deeds. This is not a case in which the deeds were 
completed after deli~ery, or in which the deeds were com-
pleted before delivery by someone not properly author-
izd to do so by the grantor. 
Appellants, in discussing Mrs. Schank's management 
of the property after she had delivered the deeds, re-
f.er to the fact that the parcel of land described in one 
of the deeds was sold under contract. That there is no 
significance to such circumstance will clearly appear 
when it is remembered that the contract of sale was made 
not after, but two years before, the deeds were delivered. 
When she delivered the deeds, Mrs. Schank told Russell 
Eschler that one parcel of land was subject to contract of 
sale. After Mrs. Schank's death, the purchase price of 
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the land was paid and impounded pending a decision of 
this case. 
Examination of the cases will show that the trial 
court's judgment and decree quieting title in Leta B. 
Eschler is sustained by most abundant authority. 
GRANTOR's INTENTION SHoULD ConTROL 
By their brief, counsel for appellants would per-
suade the court that the all-important basic question to 
be determined in this case is whether Mrs. Schank ob-
served to the letter all of the niceties of the technical 
rule~ of conveyancing. That. the essentials of these rules 
are important matters to be considered we do not deny. 
However, it occurs to us that appellants from the begin-
ning have shown a disposition to pay very slight atten-
tion to a very much more important proposition, which 
is: To whom did Mrs. Schank desire to give her prop-
erty¥ 
We shall never permit counsel to disregard without 
challenge the fact that the property ·was Mrs. Schank's 
to dispose of as she saw fit. We respectfully urge that 
the tirst duty of this court, just as it was the duty of the 
trial court, is to ascertain Mrs. Schank's intentions, if 
poss1ble to do so, and then to pay respectful heed to her 
wishes. This is the recognized rule of this court, estab-
iished and stated in the case of Boyle vs. Dinsdale, 45 
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Utah 112, 143 P. 136, wherein, passing upon the validity 
of a gift by a donor, this court said: 
'' * * *A delivery to a trustee is, in legal effect 
the same as de1ivery to the donee. Where, there-
fore, the facts are as palpably clear as they are in 
the case at bar that a gift was intended, and where 
the forms of law relating to gifts have been sub-
stantially complied with, it was the duty of the 
trial court, and it is our duty, to uphold and ef-
fectuate the purpose and intention of the donor, 
and not to defeat them by making nice distinctions 
or placing a forced or unnatural interpretation 
upon her acts or words. As pointed out by the I : 
courts, each case in which a gift is involved must, 
to a large extent, be controlled by its own peculiar 
facts and circumstances. While it is true that cer-
tain forms of 'law must be complied with, yet it is I : 
also true that the intention of the donor must also 
receive due consideration and effect, and if in mak-
ing a gift he has substantially complied with the 
latter, and it is clear that he intended to make a 
gift, his intentions must prevail.'' 
Again, in Helpe.r State Bank vs. Crus, 95 Utah 320, 
81 P. 2d 359, this. court said: 
"* * * From the foregoing cases it is evident 
that the important thing is what was the intent of 
the donor at the time of the transactions in ques-
tion. If he intended a gift, to pass a present title 
to the donee, then if his words and acts are suffi-
cient to evidence that intent it is the duty of the 
courts to hold that such a gift has taken place, but 
in a case of this kind the evidence must be clear as 
to his intent.***" 
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Again: 
• 'If there was any substantial evidence from 
which the jury could find that John Crus gave this 
money to the defendant, Annie Crus, during his 
lifetin1e, then the court erred in directing a verdict 
for the plaintiff. * * *'' 
As we have already pointed out, the record in this 
case sustains, without any dissenting or conflicting evi-
dence, the fact that Leta Eschler was the object of Mrs. 
Schank's love and affection to the absolute exclusion of 
the appellants. The record also conclusively demonstrates 
the fixed purpose of Mrs. Schank to make generous pro-
visi'ln out of her property for Leta Eschler's security. 
Even the appellants in their brief make grudging ad-
mission of this fact, and state that Mrs. Schank prob-
ably wanted to provide generously for the respondent, 
but failed to translate her desires into effective action. 
Thus they say, Mrs. Schank's wishes and desires are to 
be thwarted so that appellants, for whom this lady had 
an expressed aversion, might reap the benefits which she 
had intended to bestow upon another, and even in the 
face of the further fact of an expressed determination 
by ~Irs. Schank to prevent her property from falling into 
the hands of appellants, her undesirable rela:tives. 
The fact that respondent was the natural object of 
Mrs. Schank's bounty and generosity is of first im-
portance in the inquiry into Mrs. Schank's actual and 
probable intentions with respect to her property. In all 
of the cases upon the subject which we have read and 
considered, this question has, without exception, occupied 
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the center of the stage. This eourt, and the courts of all 
of the other jurisdictions, have laid much stress and im-
portance upon the relationship between the donor and 
donee. The courts go to great lengths to sustain gifts 
where the donee is the natural object of the donor's af-
fection, and decline to sustain such gifts only when proof 
of non-delivery to the donee is clear and beyond dis-
pute. On the other hand, where the donee is a stranger 
to the donor, the courts are much less reluctant to de-· 
clare gifts invalid, and this is especially true where the 
natural objeets of a donor's bounty will be deprived of 
property which they would otherwise receive. 
IMPORTANCE OF GRANTOR-GRANTEE RELATIONS 
The following cases illustrate the importan-ce of the 
relationship between donor and donee in attempting to 
arrive at the donor's intention: 
In Chamber~ailn vs. £,arsen, 83 Utah 420, 29 P. 2d 
355, this court said : 
''This is not a case of a grant to a stranger 
where the grantor remained in possession and con-
tinued to pay taxes, etc. and we think such con-
duct in no respect inconsistent with a prior de-
livery of the deed to the grantee.'' 
In that case the grantor was the sister of the grantee, 
and it was shown that the grantor had expressed her 
determination to see to it that the grantee's future should 
be provided for and made secure. 
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In TVoolley vs. Taylor, 45 Utah 227, 144 P. 1094, this 
court stressed the relationship existing between the 
grantor and the grantee. They were father and daughter. 
The court mentions the fact that natural bonds of affec-
tion would impel the donor to make the gift to the donee. 
In Reed vs. Knudson, 80 Utah 428, 15 P. 2d 347, the 
court discusses the fact that a grandfather, grateful to 
the donees who had cared for many years for his grand-
son, and impelled by that gratitude wanted to give ~is 
donees part of the property which he had inherited from 
the estate of his grandson. 
Again, in Wilson vs. Wilson, 32 Utah 169, 89 P. 443, 
and jn Gappmeye.r vs. Wilkinson, 53 Utah 236, 177 P. 763, 
where the donees were children of the donors, the court 
makes much of this relationship in its decision. 
In Olson vs. SooU, 61 Utah 42, 210 P. 987, the donor 
was the mother of the donee, and resided with the donee, 
who cared for her, and in its decision this court again 
emphasized the fact that the donee was the natural ob-
ject of the donor's bounty. 
In Columbia Trost Company vs. AngZum, 63 Utah 
353; 225 P. 1089, which involved a gift of a bank deposit 
from a husband to his wife, the court stresses the rela-
tionship of the donor to the donee. See also Boyle vs. 
Dinsdale, Helper State Barn.k vs·. Crus, supra. 
The following are some cases from other jurisdic-
tions which bear upon this point. Thus In Re Cwnnirng-
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ham's Es~ate, Wash., 143 P. 2d 852, the Washington 
court said: 
''Where the property is deeded to one the 
natural object of the donor's affections a gift 
rather than a trust is presumed.'' 
In that case the donee was a favorite nephew of the 
donor. 
The California court in the case of Stewart vs. Silva, 
221 P. 191, said: 
''If we not only disregard the testimony of the 
witnesses who were present at and participated 
in the delivery of the deed to the grantee, and also 
disregard the declarations made from time to time 
by the grantor that he intended to deed the prop-
erty to the grantee and that he had deeded the 
property to the grantee what have we left in the 
evidence to overcome the presumption of delivery 
arising from the possession of the deed by the 
grantee~ There is nothing substantial. The evi-
dence of continued dealing with the property 
by the grantor was not necessarily in conflict with 
the actual situation disclosed by the evidence as 
offered by the defendant. The grantor was her 
godfather, who had brought her to this country to 
keep house for him. They lived together, and it 
was quite natural that the godfather, the grantor 
of the property, should continue to deal with it, 
pay taxes, insurance, and live upon the property 
with his goddaughter, the grantee, as he in fact 
did. This would not show that the deed was not 
de'livered and the inferences arising therefrom of 
non-delivery would not be sufficient under the 
circumstances to overcome the prima facie case 
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ans1ng· from the possession of the deed by the 
grantee. The fact that the grantor at the time of 
delivery expressed a. desire that the deed should 
not be recorded until after his death and intended 
to exercise acts of ownership thereover during his 
life, if we accept the testimony of the grantee that 
such statements were made by him at the time of 
delivery of the deed, would not prevent the de-
livery from being effective, if the grantor in fact 
intended to deliver the deed.'' 
In Roche vs. Roche, Ill., 121 N. E. 621, the court 
stat~s that where conveyances are made from a parent to 
his child, the law makes a stronger presumption of de-
livery than in cases where the bonds of natural affection 
are not involved. 
In White vs. Smith, another Illinois case, 169 N. E. 
817, the court recited the relationship and the-affection 
existing between the Grantor and the Grantee, their 
mutual respect for each other, and the fact that the 
grantee was a favorite niece of the grantor. 
In another California case, DeCou vs. Howell, 214 
P. 444, where the grantee was a niece of the grantor, the 
close bond of affection existing between the grantor and 
the grantee was pointed out. It was shown that the 
grantee had lived with the grantor for several years 
during childhood, and that the grantor had expressed 
her intention to third persons of leaving grantee all of 
her property. That case is very similar to the case a:t 
bar, and points out very strongly the importance of the 
relationship between donor and donee which attaches to 
the minds of judges in deciding cases of this character. 
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Also, in cas·es where the courts have held gift deeds 
to he invalid, this question of the relationship between 
donor and donee receives much attention. 
Thus in Williams vs. Kidd, Calif., 151 P. 1, it was 
pointed out by the court that the purported grantee was 
not the natural object of the affection and bounty of the 
grantor. This court, in the case of Stamley vs. Stanley, 
97 Utah, 520, 94 P. 2d 465, cited by appellants in their 
brief, pointed out that although the grantor and grantee 
were husband and wife, they had been separated for a 
long period of time, and it was. not natural to suppose 
that the grantee would be the recipient of the grantor's 
bounty. Many other cases could he cited illustrating the 
great importance of examining with care the relation-
ship between donor and donee. 
Because of the importance of the relationship exist-
ing between Mrs. Schank and respondent, great care 
was taken during the trial of this case to emphasize its 
quality and to show beyond any possibility of dispute that 
it was of the kind and nature to impel Mrs. Schank to 
make gifts of the property in question to Mrs. Eschler. 
DELIVERY To THIRD PARTY VALID 
That a valid gift of real property may be made by 
a grantor by the delivery of a deed to a third party to be 
by such third party delivered to the grantee, even after 
the death of the grantor, is firmly rooted in the decisions. 
The requisites of such deli¥ery are that it shall be un-
conditional and shall be made with the intention of pass-
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ing to the grantee a present interest in the property. 
This court has spoken upon this proposition in unmistak-
able terms in the following cases: 
In Wilson vs. Tril-son, supra, this court said: 
'' * * * The law is well settled that 
''If a grantor delivers a deed to a third per-
son absolutely as his deed, without reservation 
and without intending to reserve any control over 
the instrument, though this is not to be de'livered 
to the grantee till the death of the grantor, the 
deed when delivered upon the grantor's death is 
valid, and takes effect from the first delivery. 
The deed in such case passes a present inter,est 
to be enjoyed in the future. * * *" 
And in Gappmeyer vs. W ilMinson, supra : 
"It has been determined by this court that, 
''Where a grantor delivers a deed to a third 
person, absolutely as his deed, without reserva-
tion, and without intending to reserve any control 
over the instrument, though it is not to be de-
livered to the grantee until after the grantor's 
death, the deed, when delivered, is valid and takes 
effect from the first delivery. * * *" 
And in Woolley vs. Taylor, supra: 
"·* * * That a consummated and valid gift 
inter vivos with postponement of present enjoy-
ment may be made cannot be doubted, if the donor 
makes unconditional delivery and parts with al1 
present and future control and dominion over the 
property. * * * Such delivery need not be made 
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to the donee personally. It may be made to a 
third person as agent or trustee for the use of 
the donee. * * * It was so made here. That the 
trustee, the banker, was not to make delivery to 
the donee until the death of the donor, did not 
destroy the validity of the gift. * * * '' 
This rule is again stated in the case of Singleton vs. 
Kelly, 61 Utah 277, 212 P. 63, quoted in appellants' brief 
as follows: 
"The law here applicable is clearly stated in 
Williams v. Kidd, 170 Cal. 631, 151 Pac. 1, Ann. 
Cas. 1916E, 703, from which we quote: 
'It is weU settled that a person may make 
a conveyance of property and place it in the hands 
of a third party to be delivered to the grantee 
named in it on the death of the grantor, and that 
such a delivery will be effectual to pass a present 
title to the property to the grantee, if the inten-
tion of the grantor is to make such delivery ab-
solute and place it beyond the power thereafter to 
revoke or control the deed. Where delivery is 
made under these circumstances and with this in-
tention, it is fully operative and effective to vest 
a present title in the grantee, the grantor retain-
ing only a life ,estate in the property and the 
third party or depositary holds the deed as a 
trustee for the grantee named in it. Bury v. 
Young, 98 Cal. 451, 35 Am. St. Rep. 186, 33 Pac. 
338; Moore v. Trott, 156 Cal. 353, 134 Am. St. 
Rep. 131, 104 Pac. 578 '.'' 
Many cases from other jurisdictions have announced 
the same rule. We shall cite but one of these. DeC10u vs. 
How ell, supra. 
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The undisputed evidence in this cas·e shows that the 
deeds under consideration were delivered to Russell 
Eschler with the accon1panying statement: 
''I am giving these properties to Leta.'' ( Tr. 
62, 63) 
Furthermore, there is no evidence of any retention 
of control over the deeds or reservation of any kind with 
respect thereto. The record contains not one shred of evi-
dence that after delivery Mrs. S:chank made any attempt 
whatsoever to regain possession of these instruments. 
Before leaving this important subject, we again de-
sire to refer to the Record and poin~ out that the fact of 
delivery is indisputably proven. In the first place, when 
the deeds were made out in the office of the Dowse real 
estate firm, Mrs. Schank announced her purpose to com-
plete and deliver the deeds at her own chosen time to 
the person she wished to have the property. We quote 
from the testimony of S. W. Dowse : 
"Q. At the time the deeds wer·e made and signed 
by ~Irs. Schank, Mr. Dowse, will you state 
what conversation took place and what Mrs. 
Schank said with respect to 'these deeds. 
A. Mrs. Schank requested us to make out these 
deeds ; she said she believed that she wanted 
to set some of her affairs in order and that 
she wanted to, to have these deeds made so 
that at sometime or other that she saw fit she 
could convey the property to certain parties, 
or certain party, and so that it would not go 
to other parties that she did not want the 
property to go to. 
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Q. Did she identify the party to whom she in-
tended giving the deeds~ 
A. I don't believe she did at that time ; she iden-
tified the parti·es she didn't want to, that is, 
generally speaking, who she didn't want the 
properties to go to. 
Q. Did she ever express to you at any subsequent 
time the parties she had in mind as the ul-
timate grantee or beneficiary of these deeds? 
A. To my recollection, I believe she did mention 
it later on. 
Q. Can you remember now about when she made 
mention of her intention with respect to the 
grantee~· 
A. Well, not definitely; might have been a year 
later or so. 
Q. It was sometime after the deeds had been 
signed~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. What individual did she name, or individuals 1 
A. She said she had a niece that she favored 
very much, she desired her property-well, 
most of her things, to go to, in case anything 
happened to her. 
Q. Did she name-did she give the name of the 
niece at that time~ 
A. W·ell, she said her niece, Leta." (Tr. 39, 40) 
"Q. Tell us now the substance of what Mrs. 
Schank said to you regarding these other rela-
tives of hers, members of her family. 
A. Well, I don't remember the exact words, but 
she on severa1 occasions n1ade mention that 
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she had certain other relatives she didn't get 
along with very well, that they were not on 
very friendly tern1s, and anything that she 
might possess she didn't intend leaving them 
anything.'' ( Tr. -!5) 
Next we have the uncontroverted evidence of Russell 
Eschler. He says: 
"Q. Now, :Jir. Eschler, let m,e call your attention 
to a particular date, and I will ask you first 
of all if you can remember the time when--=-
or the date when Mrs. Schank came to visit 
you at Saratoga, California, the month and 
the year when this occurred~ 
A. I remember the month; I can't place a defi-
nite date in the month. I remember the year; 
it was in March, 1946. 
Q. All right, Mr. Eschler, state whether or not 
-have you ever seen these instruments be-
fore~ (Exhibits 1 to 9, inclusive) 
A. Yes, I have ; they are deeds that Mrs. Schank 
delivered to me at Saratoga, California when 
she, made her visit to us there in March, 1946. 
Q. Are they the deeds you mentioned this morn-
ing that you recorded in April of 1947~ 
A. These are the same deeds. 
Q. Now, in connection with the receipt of those 
deeds, Mr. Esehler, tell us whether-or tell 
the court whether :Mrs. Schank made any 
statements of her feelings and any state-
ments at the time to you-at the time she 
delivered those deeds. 
A. Well, Mrs. Schank stated to me at that time 
that she was giving these properties to Leta, 
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and that she wanted me to hold them until 
after her death. She made that express re-
quest, and that-she stated that she didn't 
want Leta to feel any personal ob'ligation to 
her while she was still living; that tha;t was 
about the substance of it. 
Q. State whether or not Mrs. Schank said any-
thing about the revenues produced from these. 
THE COURT: I think it is suggestive, but he 
may answer. 
A. Yes, she made statements-as a matter of 
· fact, we discussed my personal income at that 
time and the revenue derived from these 
properties, and she stated that it was her 
opinion that it would be a burden to us to pay 
the taxes in excess of the revenues on these 
properties, and she stated that she wanted 
to pay those taxes herself for Leta. 
Q. Now, Mr. Eschler, you have examined the 
deeds; tell us whether the deeds, what con-
dition the deeds were in when you received 
them. 
A. They were in exactly the same condition that 
they are in now, other than the recording. 
Q. Mr. Eschler, what did you do with the deeds 
after you receiv·ed them from Mrs. ---
A. I kept them in my home. I have a bri·ef case in 
which I keep all my personal papers, and they 
were constantly in my possession from the 
time Mrs. Schank delivered them to me until 
the time I delivered them to Mrs. Eschler 
after Mrs. Schank was buried. 
THE COURT: Mr. Eschler, just as near as you 
can, give us the words Mrs. Schank said so 
that not stating a conclusion. 
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A. I recall she said she wanted Leta to have the 
security of those properties at all times, and 
she stated tha;t she didn't want us to-that 
is, she advised against our selling any of 
them immediately, that she thought the se-
curity lay in our retention of them and it 
·was for that reason that she suggested that 
she pay the taxes, inasmuch as my income 
would not support my family and support 
additional costs on these properties. 
THE COURT: Did I understand this is at the 
time when she delivered-
~\. This is at the time when she delivered the 
deeds to me, yes." ( Tr. 60-65) 
Appellants did not produce any ,evidence contradict-
ing the testimony of Russell Eschler. He was corrobor-
ated by the direct and positive testimony of Mrs. Bane, 
to whom ~Irs. Schank reported that she had delivered 
deeds covering real property to Russell Eschler : 
'' Q. Mrs. Bane, did ~Irs. Schank ever teli you 
about having made any disposition of any 
part of her property~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You may answer that yes or no. 
A. Yes, she did. 
Q. When did she make mention of the disposi-
tion of property to you~ 
A. When she returned from Saratoga. 
Q. When was that~ 
A. 1946. 
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Q. You remember the month~ 
A. March. 
Q. Who was present when she made this state-
ment to you about disposing of the property? 
A. I don't think there was anyone present. 
Q. You and she were alone together~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where were you~ 
A. In my home. 
Q. What did she tell you at tha:t time~ 
A. She told me that she had delivered certain 
deeds to Russell.'' (Tr. 87, 88) 
We submit that the foregoing record establishes the 
delivery of the deeds beyond any question. But even had 
respondent failed to ·establish by evidence the delivery of 
these deeds from Mrs. Schank to Russel Eschler, the very 
fact that the deeds were found in the possession of the 
grantee upon the grantor's death and the further fact 
that she recorded them, all of which is undisputed, would 
have required appellants to show by competent evidence 
the fact of non-delivery. Under the decisions of this court, 
such a showing is sufficient to prove a prima facie case 
of valid delivery. This burden the appellants may not 
shift by a mere baseless attack upon the credibility of 
Russell Eschler unsupported by any evidence whatso-
ever. 
In the case of Chamberlain vs. Larsen, supra, this 
court held that there was a presumption of valid delivery 
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by showing the grantee's possession of the deed after the 
grantor's death, even though there was no showing that 
grantee's possession of the deed originated before the 
grantor's death. This court said: 
· • The rule seems to be well settled that a 
deed duly executed and acknowledged and shown 
to be in the possession of the grantee is self-prov-
ing both as to the execution and delivery and that 
the recording of a deed is likewise evidenc-e of 
delivery * * * (Citing cases) and this is true 
though the deed be not recorded until after the 
death of the grantor * * * '(cases) or though 
there be no affirmative showing that the grantee's 
possession originated prior to the death of ~the 
grantor* * * (cases)." 
"And not only is the burden of proving non-
delivery upon the plaintiffs, but the inference of 
delivery arising from possession of the deed by 
the grantee and from the recording thereof is 
entitled to great and controlling weight and can 
only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence 
* * * (cases) . " 
''So in this jurisdiction * * * a 'presumption 
of law' is a rule of law casting the burden of 
proof on him against whom the presumption op-
erates, but when the facts and circumstances are 
shown concerning which the presumption is in-
dulged, the presumption ceases and the contro-
versy is tQ be decided by the weight of the evi-
dence adduced, etc. * * * tested by these prin-
ciples, we think the evidence of the plaintiffs in-
sufficient to sustain the burden of proof and es-
tablish the non-delivery of the deed in question. 
'"''"''"'" 
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This matter of the burden of proof is alluded to only 
because it shows how far appellants have failed to sus-
tain their case by competent evidence. 
Intention to make a gift of real estate is evidenced 
by the surrender of the instrument of title to the donee, 
or to some third party for the donee's benefit, without 
reservation of control over that instrument by the 
grantor. See Woolley vs. Taylor, Wilson vs. Wilson and 
Gappmeye.r vs. Wilkinson, supra. Resort may also be 
made to the acts of the grantor prior to and at the time 
delivery is made, and even to the subsequent acts and 
conduct of the grantor .after delivery has occurred. We 
shall hereafter make specific reference to the decisions 
on this point. 
In the record of this case, all of these matters re-
ceived the full consideration of the trial court. After 
due consideration, the trial court found that delivery of 
the deeds was made with the intention of giving the prop-
erties to respondent. We respectfully submit that any 
other finding by the trial court would have been error. 
GRANTOR's SuBSEQUENT CoNDUCT NoT 
INCONSISTENT wITH DELIVERY 
Appellants attack the findings made by the trial 
court that there was a delivery of the deeds with an in-
tention to pass an immediate interest to Mrs. Eschler, 
upor.t the sole ground that the subsequent acts of Mrs. 
Schank, as they related to the properties, were so in-
consistent and at variance with this finding as to make 
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the finding untenable. They ignore entirely the tesHmony 
of what preceded and what lH_·rnrrPd at the time of de-
livel'y, They point out that ~Irs. Schank continued to pay 
taxes, collect rents, maintain the property, report the 
income from it, and finally that she discussed the sale 
of it with various persons and made references to the 
property which indicated ownership. All of this sub-
sequent conduct of :Jirs. Schank, which, standing alone, 
might appear to be inconsistent, was fully explained by 
the respondent. Appellants also have asserted that no 
control over or possession of the property was passed 
on to Mrs. Eschler at the time of delivery, and conse-
quently there could be no valid transfer of title. We shall 
refer to many cases in which the grantee got no control 
over the property, and to the fact that in some of the 
decisions the grantee was entirely ignorant of the exist-
ence of the deed until after the grantor was dead. In such 
cases, lack of possession and control has been dismissed 
as constituting no proof that an interest did not vest in 
the donee upon delivery of deeds. 
The8e matters to which counsel refer are only evi-
dence to be considered in arriving at the question of in-
tention, and they have been disregarded in many cases 
where they have been shown to exist. The record shows 
that when Mrs. Schank made delivery to Eschler, she 
explained fully the conduct now seized upon by plaintiffs 
as the only substantial hope of depriving Mrs. Eschler of 
her property. 
Furthermore, appellants completely overlook the 
fact that all of the acts and conduct with respect to this 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
42 
property, including Mrs. Schank's declarations of owner-
ship, can be fully and sa:tisfactorily explained on the 
basis of the deeds passing title to Mrs. Eschler at the 
time of their delivery, with the reservation of a life 
estate. In Wils~on vs. Wilson, supra, this court recognized 
the rule that where a deed passes. irrevocably beyond the 
control of the grantor, a present interest may pass to the 
donee, with possession and enjoyment of the property 
postponed to a future time. The court said, quoting Jones 
on Real Pro\P!e'fity : 
'' * * * The deed in such case passes a present 
interest to he enjoyed in the future.'' 
In California, Oklahoma and Idaho, the courts have 
held that such a transfer passes title with a life estate 
reserved to the grantor. See DeCou vs. Howell, supra, 
HimJihaw vs. Hopkins, Calif., 99 P. 2d 283, Stewart vs. 
Silva, supra, Brant vs. Brwnt, Calif., 260 P. 342, Herman 
vs. Mortenson, Calif., 164 P. 2d 551, Kay vs. W~alling, 
Okla., 225 P. 385, Cell vs. Drake, Ida., 100 P. 2d 949. 
All of these cases hold that where a grantor delivers 
a deed to a third party which is not to be delivered to 
the grantee until after the grantor's death, the title 
passes subject to a life estate in the grantor. The Su-
preme Court of Idaho in Cell vs. Drake, supra, said: 
''Under a well recognized line of authorities 
in this country, a deed to real property may he 
executed and placed in the hands of a depositary 
or escrow holder for delivery to the grantee after 
the death of the grantor, and constitutes a present 
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passage of title with a reservation of a life estate 
in the grantor.'' 
Mrs. Schank was not a lawyer and could not be ex-
pected to be familiar with the technical rules of con-
veyancing, but if what she did was consistent with the 
requirements of those rules, the court should have no 
difficulty in giving effect t.o her intentions. 
A grantor may divest himself of title by delivery of 
a deed to a third party to be delivered after the grantor's 
death to the grantee. Secondly, delivery is a matter of in-
tention, and intention at the time of delivery is control-
ling. Wilson vs. Wilson, supra, Gappmeyer vs. Wilkitnson. 
supra, Singleton vs. Kelly, supra, Boyle vs. Dins1male; 
supra, and Helper State Bank vs. Crus, supra. 
If control and possession of the property after de-
livery of the deed is the decisive factor, then there are 
many cases which have wrongfully upheld gifts, because 
in many of them, as we have previously stated, no control 
or possession was turned over to the grantee. Such was 
the fact in Woolley vs. ~aylor, supra, Gappmeyer vs. 
Wilkinson, supra, and Chamberlaim vs. Larsen, supra. 
In Woolley vs. Taylor, supra, the donor endorsed certain 
stock certificates and gave them to his hanker for de-
livery to his children after his death. The donees never 
had possession of the certificates until after the donor 
died, when they received them from the banker. The 
father took all of the dividends from the stock and ex-
changed the certificates for new shares issued by the 
company. Yet in that case, the gift was upheld. 
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In Gappmeyer vs. Wilkinsorn, supra, there is nothing 
In the record which shows that grantees, who were 
grantor's minor children, ever had possession or con-
trol of property, and yet the court held that a valid gift 
was consummated by the grantor. 
In Chambedain vs. Larsen, supra, there is no evi-
dence that the grantee had any possession oi control 
over the property prior to the death of the grantor. The 
evidence was that the grantee lived upon the property 
with the grantor, but that is all the evidence on that point. 
The record is conclusive upon the fact that the grantor 
managed and controlled the property at all times. Not-
withstanding the grantee had no control over the prop-
erty, the deed was declared valid. 
In Re Cunningham's Estate, supra, the Washington 
court held specifically that a valid gift of real property 
inter vivos could be made and the grantor retain control, 
use and management of the property: 
''A valid gift of the fee of real estate may be 
made inter vivos, donor retaining the use, manage-
ment and control of the property during his life-
time * * * (Citing cases) '' 
Quoting further: 
''This may be effected by donor delivering 
deed to third party for delivery to donee at 
donor's death, if donor irrevocably parts with 
possession of deed. * * * " (Citing cases) 
In DeCou vs. How ell, supra, the grantee had no 
knowledge of any deed in her favor, and obviously could 
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not have exercised control over or had possession of the 
property. 
Likewise in Brant ~·s. Brant, supra, the V!llidity of 
deeds was upheld although the grantees knew nothing 
about their existence. There was. no evidence that the 
grantee exercised any acts of control or ever had pos-
session of the property. This plainly shows again that 
counsel are in error when they say that the donee must 
have possession and control of the property for the gift 
to be good. 
In Hinshaw vs. Hopkins, Calif., supra, the grantor 
executed the deed and left it with her attorney to be de-
livered to the grantee in the event she failed to recover 
from an operation for cancer. At that time she told the 
attorney that if she recovered, the deed was to be re-
turned to her, as she then wanted the property for her-
self. The deed to the grantee was held valid, though 
there was no evidence the grantee ever had possession or 
control of the property. The court quotes from M~oore 
vs. Trott, Calif., 122 P. 462: 
"It has long, if not always, been the rule that 
the delivery of an instrument is a question of in-
tent, and that to a complete delivery no precise 
form of words and no particular character of act 
is necessary. The delivery is sufficient and com-
plete if from any or all of the circumstances the 
grantor has made known his intention irrevocably 
to part with his dominion and control over the in-
strument, to the end that it may presently vest 
title in another. * * * '' 
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See also RaJ~terman vs. Lodge, 13 F. 2d 805, which 
involved a gift inter vivos of personal property. 
In Neely vs. Buste.r, Calif., 195 P. 736, the court 
says that when a grantor without reservation parts with 
a deed intending thereby a transfer of present interest 
to the grantee, the gift is complete. In that case the 
grantee knew nothing about the execution of the deed. 
That being so, it would have been impossible for her to 
assume possession and control of the property. 
In Hie·rman. vs. M orotens•on, Calif., 1·64 P. 2d 551, the 
grantee never did obtain knowledge of the existence of a 
deed in her favor, but died in ignorance of its existence. 
It was held the gift was complete. See also Wilkerson vs . 
.Seib, Calif., 127 P. 2d 904, where the grantee first learned 
of the deed three years after the grantor died. 
In Smith vs. BZack, Neb., 9 N.W. 2d 193, the grantees 
had no knowledge of deeds in their favor until after the 
grantor's death. The gift was held complete. 
See also Boyer vs. Badley, Ind., 66 N.E. 2d 903, 
where the grantee did not know a deed had been executed 
in her favor until after grantor died. Here again the 
gift was held complete. See also Pr.o·sser vs. Nickolay, 
Wis., 23 N.W. 2d 403, and Cell vs. Drake, supra, which 
are to the same effect. 
We reiterate that Mrs. Schank's intention and de-
sires with respect to this property lead to but one con-
clusion, namely, that she intended to give the property to 
Mrs. Eschler. The courts have carried out similar in-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
47 
tentions in the face of every one of the elements which 
the appellants here insist show that the gift in this case 
may not be upheld. 
In Wilson L'S. Wilson, supra, the evidence showed 
that the grantor continued in possession of the proper'ty 
after he had executed deeds to it. The grantees testified 
that they would have surrendered the deeds to the· 
grantor upon his demand. Yet it was held those facts did 
not destroy the validity of the deeds. 
In Gappmeyer vs. Wilki!Mon, supra, the grantor 
made subsequent deeds to the property, which it was held 
did not affect the prior gift. 
In Cha-mberlain vs. Larsen, supra, the grantor con-
tinued to pay taxes and insurance and negotiated for the 
sale of the property and made references to it as her 
own, and yet the deed was held to constitute a va:lid gift 
to grantor's sister. 
In DeCou. vs. Howell, Calif., supra, it was held that 
a deed was a valid gift where the grantor, after making 
the deed, contracted to sell the property described in the 
deed, continued to pay the taxes upon the property, and 
referred to it in conversations with others as hers. 
In White vs. Smith, IlL, supra, grantors negotiated 
for the sale of the land a~ter deliv;ery of the deed. This) 
was held not to invalidate the gift. 
In Stewart vs. Silva, supra, grantors continued the 
use of the land, the taking of the income and profits, in-
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eluding leasing the land, and payment of taxes and in-
surance, which did not overcome the validity of the gift. 
In Br(J;nt vs. B~o.;nt, supra, the grantor mortgaged 
the property after he executed a deed. H.e also made out 
subsequent deeds and a will covering the same land. The 
subsequent conduct of the grantor was held not to have 
shown an intention not to make a gift at the time the 
deed was delivered. 
In Wilkerson vs. Seib, supra, the grantor after de-
livery of the deed continued payment of taxes, insurance, 
collection of rentals, all of which the court held did not 
show an intention not to make a gift when the deed was 
delivered. 
In Fender vs. Foust, Mont., 265 P. 15, and Wilcox 
vs. 1/tardesty, Calif., 212 P. 633, grantors made deeds and 
wills subsequent to delivery of the deeds, which was like-
wise held not to sustain contentions that no gift had been 
made by the grantor. 
In J(iay vs. Walling, supra, the grantor listed the 
property for sale, which the court also stated did not 
prove that no gift had been intended hy the grantor. 
All of those cases show that counsels contention with 
respect to the controlling effect of a grantor's subse-
quent acts is just not the law. 
Furthermore, the courts have spoken upon the rela-
tive weight to he given subsequent acts of the grantor in 
determining the grantor's intention at the time of de-
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livery, as compared to the weight to he given to what 
is shown to have occurred at the time of delivery. 
In Chamberla·i.n vs. La·rse·n, supra, this court says 
that possession of the deed by the grantee, though not 
shown to have originated prior to the grantor's death, is 
entitled to great and controlling weight. 
The case of Roche vs. Roche, supra, likewise is to 
the same effect, especially when the grantor and grantee 
are parent and child. 
We submit that in this case we have as strong a re-
lationship as could exist between parent and child. 
In Bra;nt vs. Brant, supra, the California court has 
expressly said that subsequent acts of the grantor are 
not conclusive upon the question of intention, but only 
furnish evidence to be weighed by the trier of the fact. 
vVe cannot leave a discussion of this subject without 
reminding the court that Mrs. Schank never did sell any 
of the properties described in the deeds before this 
court. Even on the best market obtainable, she consistent-
ly and steadfastly refused to seil. The reasons which she 
gave for not selling are of minor importance. The fact is 
that she never deviated from her intent and purpose of 
holding all of the properties for her niece according to 
her expressed determination. 
Furthermore, if the grantor once makes a valid de-
livery of a deed with the intention of passing title to the 
grantee, he cannot thereafter have a change of heart and 
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undo what has occurred by subsequent acts, calculated 
to divest the grantee of his title. 
In Gappmeyer vs. Wilkinson, supra, the grantor at-
tempted to convey the property after delivery of his deed 
to a third party for the benefit of his minor children. 
This court held his subsequent acts had no effect upon 
that delivery. See also Wilcox vs. Bardesty, supra; Kay 
vs. W,alling, supra; Cell vs. Drake, supra. 
In this case we have no such attempt being made by 
the grantor. Mrs. Schank never attempted to recall her 
deeds. She remained steadfast to her fixed purpos·e of 
maintaining the properties for the benefit of her favorite 
and beloved niece. 
We now refer to the argument of counsel that the 
deeds in dispute were invalid because at the time they 
were signed and acknowledged by Mrs. Schank the name 
of the grantee was not written in. 
Counsel has cit.ed and referred to cases holding that 
a grantee is essential to the va:lidity of a deed. A grantor 
may, however, sign and acknowledge a deed and there-
after insert the name of the grantee. Courts have held in 
numerous cases that this may be done. In fact, the cases 
have gone so far as to hold that a grantee's name may be 
inserted after delivery of the instrument and after its 
recording, and have even gone to the extent of holding 
that if a grantor signs a deed in blank and delivers it 
to a person, intending thereby 'to vest title in him, the 
person receiving it is impliedly the agent of the grantor 
to fill in the name of the grantee, and upon that being 
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done, the deed is valid. In this case, this court need not 
go to any such lengths to find the deeds here involved to 
be valid. The undisputed evidence is that they were 
complete when handed to Russell Eschler by Mrs. 
Schank. The only permissible inference is that :Mrs. 
Schank herself completed them or had some person do it 
for her. 
DEEDs CoMPLETE BEFORE DELIVERY 
In Utah, so far as we have been able to determine, 
there have been only two cases decided upon the ques-
tion of deeds delivered in blank. One of those cases is 
Beatty vs. Shelley, 42 Utah 592, 132 P. 1160. In that case 
a grantor signed a deed and gave it to a trustee, with 
the understanding that the name of a certain grantee 
was to be inserted. The defendant wrongfully obtained 
possession of the deed, and without the knowledge, con-
sent or permission of plaintiff inserted his own name 
as the grantee. It was certainly proper, in that case, for 
this court to decide, which it did, that the deed conveyed 
no title to the defendant. 
And in Utah State Building ·and Loan Associatvon 
vs. Perkins, 53 Utah 474, 173 P. 950, the purported 
grantor signed two blank deeds in which there was no 
description, consideration or grantee named. These 
deeds were subsequently completed by a grantee with-
out the knowledge, consent or permission of the grantor. 
It was held under these circumstances that the deeds 
did not convey any title to the property described there-
in. 
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From other jurisdictions we have many cases involv-
ing the question of the delivery of deeds in blank. Thus 
in Wright vs. Sconyers, Okla., 300 P. 672, the court held 
that where a deed is left blank as to the grantee, and 
delivered to a third party to fill in the name of the 
grantee when his identity is established, the name of the 
grantee may be inserted by anyone under the direction 
of the person authorized to fill it in, and the deed is 
then complete and good. The court cites the following 
as the correct rule : 
''The modern, and as we think, the better 
rule, is that authority may be given by parol to 
insert the name of the grantee in a deed, ,even 
after delivery, and such authority may be implied 
from the circumstances." (From Gutherie vs. 
Field, Kan. 116 P. 217.) 
And further : 
"It will thus be seen that the tendency is to 
uphold such deeds where the effect thereof is to 
carry out the intention of the grantor.'' 
In Gilmore vs. Shearre.r, Iowa, 197 N.W. 631, Scott 
and Shearer were made parties to a foreclosure suit 
upon the theory that they had by contract assumed and 
agreed to pay a mortgage. They were not named as 
grantees in the deed, but had accepted a deed made out 
in blank by the mortgagor. The name of the grantee 
was inserted after they had accepted delivery of the 
deed in blank. It was held that Scott and 'Shearer were 
liable under the covenants in the deed, even though the 
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deed was blank as to the name of the grantee. It was 
held that they could not escape liability for covenants 
in a deed by merely passing the deed on to a subsequent 
grantee and filling in such grantee's name, leaving their 
own names out of the instrument. The deed was held 
to be valid and binding. 
In Ba.rth ~t:s. Barth, Wash., 143 P. 2d 542, the court 
had before it a deed in which the name of the grantee 
was left blank. It was held in that case that the deed 
was void. The court, however, says: 
"A number of states have adopted the rule 
that an authority subsequently to insert the 
grantee's name in a deed must be in writing. In 
this state, however, we have followed what we 
think is the more reasonable rule, that a deed in 
which the name of the grantee is left blank but 
which is otherwise 'lawfully executed will vest title 
in a person whose name is subsequently inserted 
therein as grantee by one having authority from 
the grantor so to do, and that in the absence of 
any fraud such authority may ordinarily be in-
ferred from the fact of possession of the deed by 
the person who fills in such blank. * * *" (Citing 
cases.) 
And in Bryant vs. Barger, Ind., 42 N.E. 2d 429, 
the court held that where a deed was made by a grantor 
with the name of the gran tee left blank, which blank 
was filled in before delivery to the grantee, the deed 
was valid. The court pointed out that a deed before de-
livery is inoperative, whatever its condition of complete-
ness may be, and if completed after it has been signed 
and before delivery, it is valid. 
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In Durbin vs. Bennett, Ill., 31 F. Supp. 24, the court 
had before it the question of validity of two deeds con-
veying a one-half interest in certain oil rights. The evi-
dence was conflicting as to whether the name of the 
grantee and the description was inserted in the deeds 
before the grantors executed them. However, both 
grantors testified that they signed the deeds, intending 
thereby to convey a one-half interest in the property 
and expecting the deeds would be completed as to grantee 
and the description by the agent to whom delivered. 
Held that under Illinois law the deeds were valid, though 
no grantee or description was inserted at the time of 
delivery. The court stated: 
''Illinois courts have been firm in their state-
ment that in every grant there must be a grantee, 
a grant and a thing granted and that omission of 
any of these essentials invalidates :the transaction. 
* * * But Illinois also recognizes the rule that if 
the grantors ·execute and deliver deeds with the 
understanding that there shall be inserted the 
name of the grantee, the omission of the name is 
not necessarily destructive of the conveyance. As 
said in Sirois vs. Sirois, * * * 'the fact that the 
grantee's name was in neither deed at the time 
it was executed did not necessarily vitiate the 
deeds, if the authority was given to insert the 
name before de'livery,' and the burden of proof 
is upon the grantor to prove fraud to avoid 
validity. * * *" 
In Chest(YI)Ut vs. Worley, Ok~a., 23 P. 2d 196, the 
plaintiff had executed a deed to mineral rights in cer-
tain lands and gave the deed to his agent for the purpose 
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of effecting a sale of the land. The name of the grantee 
was left blank. The defendant subsequently purchased 
the mineral rights, paid for them, and was given the 
deed, and defendant thereupon inserted his own name 
as grantee. Plaintiff sought to set aside the de~d on 
the ground that he had withdrawn the land from sale, 
and the agent had no authority to make it, and that 
plaintiff had not authorized a sale to the defendant or 
the insertion of defendant's name as grantee. It was 
held that the deed was valid. The fact that the defen-
dant inserted his own name after the purchase at the 
direction of plaintiff's agent was immaterial. 
And in Strange vs. Maloney, Okla., 61 P. 2d 725, 
the question was whether the defendant had assumed 
a certain mortgage indebtedness upon property to which 
he had a deed from the mortgagor in which the name 
of the grantee was in blank. This deed was in defen-
dant's possession. On the effect of leaving the name of 
a grantee blank in a conveyance, the court said: 
"In so far as the first assignment is con-
cerned, it may be said that the general rule, amply 
supported by authorities, holds that an instrument 
purporting to be a deed in which a blank has been 
left for the name of a grantee, is no deed and is 
inoperative as a conveyance. * * * However, this 
court has held that while a deed executed with the 
name of the grantee left blank is defective and in-
complete, yet if the name is inserted by the author-
ity of the grantor, it may become valid and ef-
fectiv·e as a conveyance. * * *" 
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And in Oalhown vs. D.rass, Penna., 179 Atlantic 568, 
an attempt was made to set aside a deed on the ground 
of preference. The question was raised as to the effect 
of this deed, assuming it was a fact, having been execu-
ted with the name of the grantee blank. The court said: 
'' * * * That a deed cannot exist as such with-
out a grantee is fundamental, but the law con-
trolling such instrument is vastly different from 
that covering a deed without a grantee where 
authority is given, to some one to insert 'the 
gran tee's name. While there is a conflict of de-
cisions as to whether that authority should be in 
writing or whether it may be oral, ·express or 
implied from the circumstances, a majority of 
jurisdictions do not require written authority 
to insert the grantee's name; Pennsylvania is one 
of the oldest of that dass. An agent of the grantor 
may insert the name of the grantee notwithstand-
ing such direction is verbal and many states (cit-
ing Iowa, Washington, New York and Missouri) 
recognize the doctrine of implied authority to 
insert the name of the grantee in the blank space 
left therefor. Our statute of frauds * * * would 
seem not to require written authority to insert the 
name of the grantee. * * *'' 
'' * * * A valid deed may be signed, acknowl-
edged, and delivered with the name of the grantee 
left blank, provided there is authority, oral or 
written, express or implied, in some one to fill 
in the blank. * * * ' ' 
And in Edmons1on vs. W.a~e1"st1on, Mo., 119 S.W. 
2d 318, the court had before it a case involving a deed 
signed in blank. It was claimed that the name of the 
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grantee had been inserted in the deed without the con-
sent of the grantor. The court held the deed to be valid, 
and discussed the effect of a deed signed in blank as 
follows: 
"* * * When a deed is executed and de-
livered in blank, with parol authority to fill the 
blank with the name of the grantee, the grantee 
whose name is afterwards, inserted takes a good 
title. * * * And this is true though the blank be 
filled in the absence of the grantor. * * *" 
The case also cites Farmers Bank vs. Wo,rthington, 
JHo., 46 S."\V. 745, as follows: 
"In 18 C.J. p. 188 Sec. 77 * * * we find the 
following: 'A deed executed in blank is, accord-
ing to the great weight of authority, void. It has, 
however, been decided that a deed signed in blank 
but filled in when delivered is valid. * * *" 
And in Holliday vs. Clark, another Missouri case, 
110 S.W. 2d 1110, a grantor conveyed property by deed 
to her son, which was to be held by him for her benefit. 
The son immediately thereafter executed a deed to the 
same property back to the grantor and delivered it, in 
which no grantee was named. This deed was retained 
by the grantor but was never completed. During her 
last illness, the defendants obtained possession of the 
deed without authority and the name of one of them 
was inserted in the second deed after the grantor's 
death. The deed was held to be invalid. In speaking 
of the effect of the grantor's son delivering to grantor 
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a deed with the name of the grantee omitted, the court 
said: 
'' * * * Mrs. Holliday was at all times, at least, 
the beneficial owner, with the equitable title; and 
since she had a deed delivered to her with the 
grantee's name left blank, it was certainly a 
reasonable inference, and one which we hold, that 
the court was warranted in making from the cir-
cumstances of the transaction; that she had 
authority to complete this deed by filling in her 
own name and thus becoming the lega'l owner. 
***" 
And in Gilbert vs. Plowmmn, Iowa, 256 N.W. 746, 
the question of the validity of a deed executed and de-
livered by plaintiffs to the defendant pursuant to an 
agreement of purchase in which the name of the grantees 
was omitted from the deed was considered. The court 
said: 
"It has long been held in this State that 
authority to a grantee to fill a blank in a deed is 
implied when the grantor delivers the deed fully 
executed in other respects. * * *'' 
And from Hall vs. Kary, Iowa, 110 N.W. 930: 
"* **it must be presumed that although plain-
tiff's deed was blank as to grantee, the intention 
was to vest Chamberlain with title to the property 
described therein, and authorize him to insert 
the name of a grantee as he should see fit. That 
a deed thus left blank as to the grantee, be-
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ing otherwise fully executed, vests title in the per-
son whose name is subsequently insert.ed therein 
bv the one to whom it is delivered as a conveyance 
i~ well settled in this state. * * *" 
, The court in that case then went on to state that 
the statute of frauds did not apply or prevent evidence 
of the transaction from being received. And finally, see 
Tumansky vs. Woodruff, Calif., 57 P. 2d 1372, in which 
the court said: 
"* * * The escrow instructions, it will be re-
called, specifically provided that the named 
grantees would take the deeds in their own names 
or in the name of their nominee. We believe ifuat, 
since they accepted the deed in its blank form, 
they received authority from the escrow agent to 
insert the name of the grantee, and that the escrow 
agent had the power to delegate this authority . 
• * *" 
The foregoing cases clearly hold that the omission 
of the name of the grantee at the time of execution and 
acknowledgment by a grantor is not fatal to the validity 
of the instrument. The thing of importance is: What 
is the condition of the deed at the time it is delivered~ 
If a completed instrument at that time, the deed in all 
respects is entitled to the same weight and to the same 
legal effect as though the name of the grantee had been 
inserted at the time the grantor signed and acknowledged 
it. 
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TEsTAMENTARY DocuMENTS Do NOT AFFECT 
RESPONDENT's TITLE 
After this case had been filed in the court below, two 
papers were found among the effects of Mrs. Schank at 
her home on Second A venue. One purported to be an olfo-
graphic will dated June 17, 1926 (Exhibit "P"). The 
other was a separate document and bore no date and no 
clue to the date of its execution (Exhibit "A"). Both 
documents were offered for probate in the court having 
jurisdiction of Mrs. Schank's estate. A hearing was had 
at which the probate of both documents was protested. 
The court admitted to probate the purported will of June 
17, 1926, but rejected the undated and unindentified slip 
of pa:per. Both the will and the undated paper were of-
fered in evidence in the court below. Over objections by 
respondent, both papers were received in evidence. 
Neither the will nor the undated document can have 
any significance in this case. It will be remembered that 
the will is dated June 17, 1926. At that time Leta was 
still a child, and Jennie Schank's husband, Louis Schank, 
and her mother, Mrs. Burnham, still had many years to 
live. 
Louis died in 1936 and Mrs. Burnham in 1944. 
There is no doubt that as early as 1926 Mrs. 
Schank and her husband both were warmly attached to 
Leta, but Mrs. Schank's purpose to leave substantial 
property to Leta and thereby secure her financially did 
not become fixed until after the death of Louis Schank 
in 1936. 
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By the time ~Irs. Schank made de'livery of the deeds 
conveying the several parcels of land to Leta, ~fr. Schank 
and ~Irs. Burnham were dead, and Leta was married and 
her children had come along to liven the interest and 
quicken the affection of Mrs. Schank. By that time, 
furthermore, ~Irs. Schank had reached the avowed state 
of mind toward at least one of the appellants of such 
hostility as to exclude him from her property. 
Certainly the will wholly fails to support any argu-
ment against the validity of the deeds, as delivered in 
~larch of 1946, or against the finding of the court below 
that :Jirs. Schank intended to give property to Leta. 
Exhibit "A" was rejected for probate because, 
among other reasons, it was undated and the time when 
it was made was left only to speculation. It could have 
been made before the will of 1926, or any time after up 
until the death of ~Irs. Burnham in 1944. The only basis 
for any justifiable conclusion with respect to when it 
was made was that it was made while Mrs. Burnham was 
still living. It refers to certain deeds, but there is nothing 
in the instrument to justify the conclusion it referred to 
the deeds involved in this case. It may have been made 
shortly after the will of 1926. Such a guess is as good as 
any other, as the fixing of any date must result from pure 
guess. 
It is clear upon the record, however, that Mrs. 
Schank was not the owner of seven of the nine prop-
erties here involved until some years after the execution 
of the will in 1926 (See Exhibits "B" "C" "D" "E" 
. ' ' ' ' 
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"F", "G", "H", and "I".) Exhibit "E" covers apiece 
of property located on lower Second Avenue, the title to 
which was conveyed to Jennie Burnham Schank in Oc-
tober of 1904. Exhibit "F" covers also a piece of prop-
ery located on lower Second Avenue, and it discloses that 
this property was conveyed to Louis Schank and Jennie 
B. Schank as tenants in common June 18, 1920, and was 
thereafter conveyed by Louis Schank to Jennie B. Schank 
August 13, 1931. An examination of Exhibits "B" to 
''I'', exclusive of Exhibits '' E'' and '' F' ', discloses that 
Mrs. Schank did not secure the title to any of the prop-
erties before 1931, and as to the property covered by 
Exhibit '' F'' prior to 1931, Mrs. Schank was but the 
owner of a one-half interest therein. 
No contention was made in the court below, and none 
can be made here that either Exhibits "A" or "P" had 
any efficacy whatsoever to pass title to the properties in-
volved in this case. 
To support their argument that the deeds now under 
review are invalid because the name of Leta Eschler was 
not filled in as grantee at the time the deeds were signed, 
appellants grasp two of this court's decisions and one 
from California and another from Minnesota, none of 
which supports their contention. 
Appellants rely upon Utah State Building am;d Lo:am 
Assooiation vs. Perkins, supra. The facts there are so 
q.ifferent than those presently under review that the case 
can not help appellants. In the cited case, Perkins and 
his wife signed certain deeds. Except for the signatures 
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and acknowledgments, the deeds were blank In blank 
form they were retained by Perkins in his own private 
possession. \Vithout his knowledge or consent, they were 
taken from the place where he kept his private papers 
and the name of the grantee and the description filled in. 
In speaking of the controlling facts in the case, this 
court said: 
"It is not contended by any witness that 
Perkins was present at the time of the delivery, 
or that he knew anything of the recording of the 
deeds until sometime afterwards. N·either is it 
contended by anyone that Perkins had directed, 
instructed or authorized anyone to fill in the de-
scriptions or the considerations in the blank 
deeds.'' 
Contrast those facts with the ones now before the 
court. Here the grantor delivered the deeds which she 
had completed in every particular. 
In N ils~on v. Bamilton, 53 Utah 594, 17 4 P. 624, this 
court considered a deed in which the named grantee was 
dead at the time of execution. This court ruled that the 
deed conveyed nothing to the dead man's estate, be-
cause there was no grantee in existence at the time of 
delivery. In the case now under review, deeds which were 
fully completed, executed and acknowledged named the 
grantee who was alive at the time of delivery. 
From other jurisdictions appellants cite Trout v. 
Taylor, 17 P. (2d) 761, ·(Cal.), and Allen v. Allen, 51 N.W. 
473, (Minn.). The controlling facts in both of those cases 
are such as to deprive them of any persuasive force here. 
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In the California case, those who relied upon the deeds 
defrauded an ancient woman into signing and acknowl-
edging a deed. She thought when she signed and delivered 
the deed that a certain corporation was named as grantee. 
Unknown to her, no grantee was named in the deed. But 
after the deed was delivered, the names of certain in-
dividuals were filled in as grantees, without the grantor's 
knowledge or consent. Here the deeds were delivered by 
the grantor with respondent named as grantee. 
In the Minnesota case, the deed named no grantee 
whatever. Parole evidence that one of the grantors in 
the deed should have been named as grantee was held 
not admissable. The case is clearly not in point. 
PRooF EsTABLISHES DuE ExECUTION OF DEEDS 
Appellants claim there is insufficient proof in the 
record of the execution of the deeds. But they do not 
deny that S. W. Dowse, who was in all respects a com-
petent witness was sworn and testified upon the trial that 
he was acquainted with Mrs. Schank, the grantee, and 
that he saw her sign the deeds, and saw her acknowledge 
the deeds before a notary public. No effort was made to 
discredit Dowse's testimony. Dowse furnished all of the 
proof of execution which the statute required. Appel-
lants cite the case of Tarpey v. Deseret 8alt Oompatny, 5 
Utah 205, 14 P. 338. That case eonstrued a statute which 
was not in force at any time pertinent to the present in-
quiry. Prior to 1898 the statute provided for subscrib-
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ing witnesses to deeds, but there was no such require-
ment in 1938; or at any time since then .. 
In nlurray v. Beal, 23 Utah 548, 65 P. 726, this 
court ruled that a purported corporate acknowledgment 
to a deed was defective. Notwithstanding the absence of 
an acknowledgment, the deed was held to be admissable, 
and that ''as between the parties, and all persons who 
had actual knowledge of it, a deed does not require 
acknowledgment to render it valid.'' Neither T.arpey v. 
Salt Company, nor Murray v. Beal is applicable in this 
case. 
In Was key v. Chambers, 56 L. Ed. 885, 224 U.S. 564, 
the Supreme Court of the United States had before it 
facts unlike those here involved. The owner of a mining 
claim deeded a portion of it to one Chambers. Thereafter, 
by agreement of the parties the deed was altered to 
change the estate conveyed to a one-half interest. The 
statute involved required two witnesses to qualify the 
deed for recordation. Only one witness signed the deed, 
and the court ruled that the deed was not qualified for 
recordation. :Mrs. Schank's deed required no witnesses, 
and no change was made in the deeds after their delivery. 
Wood v. Wood, 87 Utah 394, 49 P. (2d) 416, con-
firms the rule that the court must give effect to the 
grantor's intention. In the Wood case this court em-
phasized that Mrs. Wood had made neither an ''actual 
or symbolical delivery" of the subject of the gift. Mrs. 
Wood was alive and testified to her intentions, and was 
corroborated by the cashier of the bank. In the case 
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under review, it was made clear that Mrs. Schank in-
tended to make the gift, and she made irrevocab'le de-
livery of the muniments of title pursuant to that inten-
tion. 
In SiJngleton v. Kelly, supra, this court felt itself 
bound by the findings and decisions of the trial court that 
upon all of the ·evidence the grantor had never made de-
livery of the deed, but had on the contrary left written 
instructions with the third person depository that he, 
the grantor, should be at liberty to withdraw the deed at 
such time as he might elect. It was not so with Mrs. 
Schank. She made irrevocable delivery of fully completed 
deeds, and when she did so she said, ''I am giving these 
properties to Leta.'' 
Reed v. K "YY!Udson, supra, rules that delivery is a 
matter of intention and intent is to be arrived at from 
all of the facts and circumstances in evidence. All of the 
facts and circumstances irresistibly led the trial court to 
the conclusion that Jennie B. Schank intended to and 
did make the gift to Leta B. Eschler, the one person 
in the world upon whom her affection and interest was 
focused. This court upheld the delivery in Reed v. K nud-
son, because the evidence there, just as it does here, 
showed that when the grantor left the instrument of 
grant with the third person, it was the grantor's inten-
tion to relinquish all further control of the instrument 
and have it take effect at that time. 
This court in Stanley v. Sti(Jffbley, supra, dealt with 
facts far different than those in the case of Mrs. Schank. 
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Stanley and his wife were estranged, and there was 
hostility between them. The wife had invested the hus-
band's savings over a long period in certain parcels of 
land. They separated, and some of the property was 
in the wife's name, but the piece involved in the case 
was in his name. She was not the object of his affection 
or solicitude. He held and kept the piece of property, not 
for her benefit, but in antagonism to any claim she 
might have. When he died, she filed an ancient will for 
probate and listed the disputed property as belonging to 
her husband's estate. Mrs. Schank, on the other hand, 
delivered the deeds now under review pursuant to an 
oft- repeated purpose to insure Leta's security. And 
when she delivered the deeds, she expressed the de-
sire and intention to look after and maintain the 
property for Leta, because the property was not self-
sustaining. Mrs. Schank's conduct and statements were 
in full harmony with her purpose, as expressed at the 
time of delivery, and in full harmony with respondent's 
contentions. Irrevocable delivery of the deeds and sub-
sequent care and preservation of the property by Mrs. 
Schank were in harmony with the relationship which 
existed between her and Leta from Leta's infancy to 
the last day of Mrs. Schank's life. 
RussELL EscHLER A CoMPETENT WITNESS 
Russell Eschler married Leta in 1935. Before the 
deeds had been delivered to him in March of 1946, he 
had gained the confidence and respect of Mrs. Schank. 
Because he was Leta's husband, Mrs. Schank was con-
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cerned for his welfare, and because he conducted himself 
as she had hoped he would, she liked him. But the gift of 
properties was to Leta, and not to him. Any interest he 
had in the transaction was in law, an indirect, as dis-
tinguished from a direct interest. 
A husband who is devoted to his wife will naturally 
be interested in her welfare. But this court has squarely 
held that the interest of a husband as such does not dis-
qualify him as a witness in litigation between his wife 
and the estate of a deceased person. 
OlstOn v. BeaU, supra, was a suit between Olive 'Scott 
and the administrator of her mother's estate. If Olive 
Scott sustained her daim, she would be the owner of two 
bank deposits. If she failed the money would be part of 
the estate. Olive's husband testified to statements made 
by deceased that the money was Olive's. This court ruled 
that he was "entirely competent" to so testify. Olson 
v. Scott is the law of this state so far as our research has 
disclosed, and is a complete answer to appellants' con-
tention. 
Appellants cite Mower v. Mower, 64 Utah 260, 228 
P. 911. This court in that case reaffirmed its ruling in 
Olson v. Soott, supra, that ''a husband was entirely com-
petent to testify'' in behalf of his wife in such a case 
as this. Appellants would create an exception to the well-
settled rule in order to support their contention that 
there is something in the case we are now presenting 
which takes it out of the general rule. They say that if 
Mrs. Schank had not managed the property and paid the 
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taxes and expenses thereof, a burden would have fallen 
upon Russell Eschler, and that therefore Russell Eschler 
acquired a direct interest in the result of the lawsuit. But 
Russell's interest in the matter was indirect, as was that 
of the husband in Olson v. Soott, supra, and as was that 
of the children in M ou:er v. Mower, supra. Russe'll could 
have paid the taxes, or not as he might elect, or Leta 
could have sold such part of the property as was non-
productive. 
In re Fan .Alstime's Est.ate, 26 Utah 193, 72 P. 942, 
is relied upon by appellants. The case supports the posi-
tion of respondent. It was urged in the Van Alstine case 
that the guardian ad litem of minor protestants was in-
competent, because in the event of her failure to success-
fully prosecute the action she might be chargeable with 
court costs. Any interest she might have had was like 
Russell Eschler 's, an indirect interest. 
There is a strange angle to appellants' contention 
that Russell Eschler had an interest which rendered him 
incompetent. They say he might have been burdened by 
the payment of taxes if Mrs. Schank had not assumed 
that burden. In the first place, Mrs. Schank did assume 
the burden of the taxes. In the second place, if Russell 
Eschler acquired an interest based upon the possibility 
of his acquiring a tax burden, then his interest would 
have aligned him against the interest of his wife. 
Finally, upon the subject of Russell Eschler's in-
competency, appellants cite ]}f.axfield v. Sa.insbury, 110 
Utah 280,172 P. (2d) 122, which case in turn makes refer-
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ence to Mr. Justice Wolfe's learned article upon the 
"dead man's statute." Nothing in that case detracts 
from the ruling of Olson v. Scott, supra, and Mower v. 
Mower, supra, that a husband, not ·a party to the action, 
is "entirely competent," to testify in behalf of his wife, 
who is a party to the action, concerning conversations 
had with the deceased. 
A person not a party to the action is not incompetent 
by force of the statute unless he has a" direct" interest 
adverse to the estate. The word ''direct'' can not be writ. 
ten· out of the statute, and this court has unequivocally 
ruled that a husband related to the case, ~s Russell Esch~ 
ler is related to the case now under review, does not have 
a ''direct'' interest, such as to disqualify him. 
CONCLUSION 
Mrs. Schank's life was ended suddenly and without 
warning on the evening of March 30, 1947. Up until that 
very day her interest and devotion had been so focused 
upon her niece Leta that those familiar with the re-
lationship might well have expected her to leave all of 
her property of every kind to Leta. Apparently, she had 
not got around to the disposition of her entire estate. 
But she had completed gifts to Leta of the parcels of 
land involved in this case. 
As in all such cases, it is the concern of the courts 
to discover the true intention of the grantor and to give 
effect to that intention, unless there is some insuperable 
obstacle in the way. Here the intention and purpose of 
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the grantor is in all respects clear. She intended to pro-
vide security for Leta and her children. That she exe-
cuted the deeds-signed and acknowledged them-in the 
presence of S. W. Dowse was proven without conflict. 
That she completed the deeds by supplying the name of 
Leta as grantee, and thereafter delivered them uncon-
ditionally to Russell Eschler for Leta was likewise proved 
without conflict. 
Mrs. Schank's continued management of the prop-
erty, including collection of rentals, payment of taxes 
and insurance, was not inconsistent with the gift, but 
was in confirmation of it. She made the gift to Leta for 
Leta's future security and continued in control of the 
property only to protect the gift and fortify its purpose. 
As it is, substantial property will pass from Mrs. 
Schank to persons who were not embraced within her 
affections, and who were not the objects of her bounty. To 
strike down the gift of property to Leta would completely 
frustrate the long fixed and clearly expressed purpose 
and intention of the grantor. 
It is respectfully submitted that upon the facts and 
the law, the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER, 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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